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TO POLICE THE JUDGES-NOT JUST JUDGE THE POLICE

(Comments upon Reflections of a State Reviewing Court Judge Upon the
Supreme Court Mandates in CriminalCases,
by Judge Charles S. Desmond)
DAVID W. CRAIG*
The broad meaning of the verb "to police" is to
establish or keep order," and thus it is used in
many applications, from the minor sense of tidying
up a military compound to the major concept of
preserving peace among nations.
In the title of this paper, the verb is used to
call for a more orderly discipline as a framework
for the constitutional labors of our hard-pressed
judiciary.
judge Desmond, outstanding among the great
judges with a balanced concern for criminal law
procedure, has presented a statement which reflects the current judicial emphasis upon policing
the police. Unquestionably sympathetic with the
problems of the law enforcement community, his
"prime point" nevertheless is a plea for "better
training and counsel" for the "police forces of
America". 2 His immediate program is the "modernizing" and "educating" of our police.3 There is,
however, much evidence that the response to his
plea is now well under way. Federal, state and
major city law enforcement agencies-the ones
which embrace the preponderance of the problems
engaged
-for some years now have been feverishly
4
in improvement of personnel and tools.
In contrast to the frequency of the call to police
the police, little has been said or done about the
need for modernizing the judicial decisional process
at the juncture where crime and justice meet, or
about the possibility of training the judiciary
itself for its highest function-whether that function be labeled, according to opinion, as interpretation or lawmaking.
* Director of Public Safety, Pittsburgh, Pa.; Visiting Lecturer, Yale University Department of City Planning and the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School
of Public and International Affairs. Member of the
Bar of the United States Supreme Court and of state
courts.
I Webster's Third New Int'l. Dict., 1754 (1961).
2Supra p. 301.
3Id. at p. 304.
4 INT'L Assoc. or CHIEFS or PoLIcE: YEAR BooK
1964.

During the recent period in which the courtannounced doctrines concerning criminal procedure
have expanded exponentially-a period dated,
6
5
according to some views, from Griffin v. Illinois
-the specific-controversy ken and the precedentbounded technique of American jurisprudence, in
and out of scattered statutory channels, has shown
itself to be slow, uncertain and inadequate to provide law enforcement men with the "counsel"
which Judge Desmond desires them to have.
The shakiness of opinions of narrowly-divided
appellate courts is a factor which itself has frustrated certainty in the legal area where certainty
and, indeed, simplicity is most needed. That
shakiness has been confirmed by the frequency
with which dissenting doctrines have become the
core of subsequent majority opinionsY
A young behavioral science has developed for
the purpose of analyzing and quantifying judicial
decision-making. A leading work in that field,
containing a compilation of studies of the group
behavior of the Supreme Court of the United
States, states:
Our immediate concern is with the sociopsychological dimension of the formal decision-making behavior of this small, political
(in the public-policy-consequences sense)
elite group....s
Those studies use "bloc analysis" and "game
analysis" and finally "scalogram analysis"9 to
seek a procedure for "Predicting Supreme Court
Decisions Mathematically."'"
It must be admitted, of course, that the esoteric
specialist can always, through microscopic focus,
r Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gateliouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, CIUMINAL
JUsTIcE IN OUR Tm 6 (1965).
6351 U.S. 12 (1956).
7 Cf. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
8 SCHYBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JuniciAL

BEHAvIOR 11 (1959).
9 Id. at xv, xvi.

10 Id. at 316.
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bring complexity into view where the workaday
sight shows manageable simplicity. Yet, when the
policeman, or even his legal advisor, takes a
workaday look at the judicial interpretation patterns, unmanageable complexity is seen. Currently
the Pittsburgh Police Bureau has 22 supervisors
enrolled in an evening course in "Advanced Criminal Law for Policemen", provided for the law
enforcement agencies of our area by the Institute
of Local Government of the University of Pittsburgh. The best efforts of the professorial staff,
which includes a former state attorney general
and an experienced public defender, are hard put
to systematize the series of decisions of state
courts, the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, to any degree likely to provide
the working police officer with guides for his conduct in street and stationhouse.
At present it is commonplace to hear police administrators wonder aloud, and sometimes bitterly,
how the policeman can be instructed to make a
search or arrest decision correctly within a few
seconds, or plan a lawful and effective investigative
course within a few hours when, weighing like
factors, the mightiest judges and most scholarly
lawyers deliberate for months and then differ
widely among themselves.
If we grant, as we must, that the policeman is
part of our machinery of justice, why should his
alternative actions be any less settled than the
methods for administering a decedent's estate, or
for preparing a contested divorce or negligence
case?
Perhaps our legal institutions have not flatly
failed to meet the need for more clarity in criminal
procedure in our urban, industrialized, interdependent society, but they have definitely fallen
behind in the formulation of implemental standards, doubtless in view of the accelerated flood of
recent judicial doctrine.
Tam

MODERNIZATION AND TRAINING OF JUDGES

To cast a glance backward at some solutions
long passed by, it is remarkable that, despite admirable reform in judicial administration and
judicial selection in decades past, there has been
little improvement in the form and clarity of appellate opinions and, aside from the Restatements
of the American Law Institute, little other attempt to systematize the judge-made body of law.
Hardly anyone has asked why appellate opinions
must continue to follow the discoursive format of
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centuries, without being subject to some disciplines
of uniformity-structural or verbal-to permit
them to be dealt with more feasibly.
Agencies involved in doing legal research by
electronic data processing methods, such as the
Health Law Center of the University of Pittsburgh, have found that statutory materials lend
themselves more readily to computer handling
than do judicial opinions." In working with the
statutes of Pennsylvania and the ordinances of
the City of Pittsburgh, all now placed on tape, we
have found verbatim methods of electronic searching to be quite workable. Even though the disciplines of statutory drafting have developed slowly
and with varied success, the writers of statutes
have apparently evidenced some subjection to the
disciplines of communication, whereas the writers
of judicial opinions, concurrences and dissents
have, for the most part, given little thought to
such disciplines.
The professionalization-and therefore the training-of judges, as such, needs to be mentioned.
Except as the appellate-materials method of teaching has bestowed on all law school graduates some
useful habits of issue analysis and decisional
process, we have had very little training of judges
to be judges.
The National College of State Trial Judges,
held each summer at the University of Colorado,
is an excellent step, but only a beginning and only
for trial judges. A similar approach toward the
training of appellate judges is needed, on a broad
scale, to develop courts with uniform competency
to communicate judicial doctrine in more usable
form.
Being a judge, appellate or otherwise, is a very
different function from that of being a lawyer, as
the judicial training processes of Continental
countries have long recognized. Experience as a
practicing advocate may be a prerequisite to
being a judge, but it is not adequate training for
the post.
Notice of this lack should not be construed as
mere irritation at the occasional appellate opinion
which is rambling or vague or a stump-speech,
nor should it by any means be considered a criticism of the evident ability and dedication of the
vast majority of our judiciary. Individual judges
have been in the forefront of many moves to
systematize the law, both in statutory form and
11Horty, Report to the Ford Fondation, 1963-1965,
mimeo, on file University of Pittsburgh Health Law
Center.

19661

SUPREME COURT AND THE POLICE

after it is handed down from the bench; the impressive rosters of judges at judicial conferences,
serving in the efforts of the American Law Institute and the American Judicature Society and, indeed, in this very Conference, testify to the concern and responsibility of most members of the
bench. But the fact remains that the final output
of the appellate courts, the precedent-making
opinions, are amorphous in form, variable in content, difficult to synchronize and, of course, confined by the worthy limitations of the case-andcontroversy principle.
The struggles of this Conference and its predecessors to interweave judicial constitutional interpretation into a seamless or at least sturdy fabric
could have been eased by judges trained and
courts disciplined to issue decisions of comparable
tenor.
Some methods of better judicial communication
have been suggested and some are in existence.
Although the verbal systematization of legal concepts proposed by Kocurek12 and others has gained
little favor, the usefully uniform terminology of
the Restatements is with us, to be used well by
some courts and ignored by others.
We have the basic knowledge to modernize
appellate decisional processes-the communication
techniques and the computer hardware to assume
the menial burdens of legal research. The personnel development and operational development
necessary to use them are overdue.
Thus, we in the field of law enforcement must
respond even more earnestly to Judge Desmond's
call for the training of law officers and the modernization of law enforcement agencies. But, with considerable concern, we can hand back a similar
challenge to the courts, to move toward specialized
training of their personnel, modernization of their
machinery (much of which has admittedly occurred), and streamlining of their decisional
products.
CODIFICATION
Codification of legal doctrine by statute--and
by court rules, where broad procedural rulemaking power has been conferred upon the courts
-is a well-known way of systematizing uncertain
'2 KOCOUREK, Jur.AL RELATIONS (1928); KocoUREK,
THE ScmNcF Or LAW, Ch. IV,
JuralAnalysis, 235 (1930). See also HOHFELD, FUNDAmENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923) and Wigmore,
I-TRODUCTION To

Terminology of.Legal Science, 28 HA~v. L. REv. 1 (1914).

interpretative patterns previously embodied in ai
irregular series of court decisions.
The courts have frequently pointed out that, if
legislatures exercised more foresight by adopting
statutory codes in anticipation of legal problemq,
the need for much judicial interpretation would
be obviated and uncertainty avoided. In other
words, a good argument can be made that the
first duty to systematize and, hopefully, to simplify
a body of a law lies with the legislatures and not
with the courts. However, that argument is easier
to support when dealing with applications of common law or interpretations of incomplete statutes
than when confronted broadly with constitutional
interpretations, as we are today with respect to
civil rights in relation to criminal law enforcement.
The judicial power of the Supreme Court to nullify
statutes and condemn administrative procedures
has meant in fact that the Court-aided by ingenious counsel-has been the innovator, in the
sense that it has spoken to many constitutional
problems not comprehended by statutes because
not expected by the legislators.
Thus, whether or not we convict the legislative
branch of lacking foresight, the historical fact in
the area of police functions is that isolated boundary posts have first been perceived (or erected)
and marked by the judiciary; then to the legislative function falls the duty of building continuous
fence-lines inside those posts, often trusting that
much of the fence-building lies within the judicial
posts which have not yet been announced.
This problem of staying within judicial limitpoints not yet marked, by interpolation or extrapolation, lies at the core of debate when governments are driven, as we now dearly are, to
statutory or court-rule codification in order to
provide operating clarity for law enforcement.
Those who sincerely prefer to maximize the
accused individual's "rights", privacy, dignity
and aplomb, without counting the cost in the loss
of society's protection against crime, tend to
advocate placing the statutory fenceline well
within any possible future judicial limits yet unannounced.
On the other hand, the police officer and his
spokesman are duty-bound to call for all individuals to contribute to as much of a tempering of
those individual values as is necessary to afford
effective protection against crime, which threatens
all of society, and particularly the poor, with
deprivation of life, as well as of rights and dignity,
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in manners far more abrupt and harsh than even
the crudest imaginable processes of law enforcement.
We call upon the individual, in the interest of
the general welfare, to contribute property in
taxation and eminent domain, to contribute time
and thought in jury duty, and even to contribute
personal safety in the national defense. We cannot
expect, then, that there should be no sacrificial
demands upon the individual in relation to the
13
detection and apprehension of criminal offenders.
The policeman is concerned because, despite the
mobilization in police technique and equipment
now going on almost everywhere, the major
offense rate is increasing nationally, while the
14
clearance or solution rate is experiencing declines.
These issues are at the heart of the debate
which now centers upon one of the most comprehensive efforts to bring the clarifying processes of
codification to bear upon police procedure, the
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure being
developed by the deliberative methods of the
American Law Institute for potential presentation
to governmental units. 5

Tim A.L.I.

MODEL CODE IN GENERAL

The involvement of the prestigious American
Law Institute in proposing a code for police investigation and arrest processes is encouraging.
The impressive adoption record of other models
proposed by the Institute suggests that the Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure-hereinafter
called "Model Code"-if adopted by the Institute,
will be seriously considered for enactment by many
legislatures, and will not lie idle on the shelf.
Commenced in April, 1963, with the aid of a
Ford Foundation grant, 16 the Model Code has
now reached the printed form of "Tentative
Draft No. 1", in which form it was submitted by
the Council of the Institute to its members at
their May, 1966 meeting; final submission in the
form of a Council-approved official draft will have
13Inbau, Law Enforcement, the Courts, and Civil
Liberties, CRnmNAL JusTIcE IN OuR TM 119 (1965).
14Federal Bureau of Investigation, CirmE IN THE
UNITED STATES; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1964, pp.

1, 20, reports a national major crime increase of 13%
in 1964 over 1963, and a 1964 clearance rate which
dropped 2% below 1963.
15A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE; TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1 (American Law Institute, March 1, 1966)-hereinafter cited as "MODEL
CODE".
'6MODEL CODE, IX.

to occur later, before the model is definitely promulgated.
As is customary with the Institute, the major
staff work is being performed by law school personnel, with recourse to an advisory committee
composed primarily of legal experts, but also
including some police administrators, although by
no means a preponderance of the latter.17
The Model Code provisions deserve serious
study and earnest comment, particularly at its
present stage of first general publication.
As almost everyone faced with conducting a
deliberative meeting has learned, group discussion
can be most productive when attention may be
focused upon a draft proposal. Concentrating upon
such a proposal could well be more productive
than unchanneled debate about the collective
meaning of the court decisions alone.
Without attempting to repeat the summary of
content which the Model Code draft now contains
in its Reporters' Introductory Memorandum, 8
this brief paper can more usefully try to underscore the issues implicit in two of the Code's
aspects which possess the greatest importance for
the law enforcement officer's functions: (1) investigation prior to arrest, and (2) post-arrest
investigation.
INVESTIGATION PRIOR To ARREST

Of prime interest among the Model Code's
provisions dealing with investigation prior to
actual arrest are those which govern the stopping
of persons, whether as possible witnesses or suspects, for the purpose of investigation. This matter
is familiar in terms of the "stop and frisk" statutes,19 but objective discussion would do best by
avoiding that connotative label.
Model Code section 2.02 permits a police officer
to stop and detain persons for not more than
twenty minutes in two types of situations:
(1) Stopping of Persons Having Knowledge
of Crime. A law enforcement officer lawfully
present in any place may, if he has reasonable
cause to believe that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed and that any
person has knowledge which may be of
17 MODEL

CODE, V-VIL Of the 40 members of the

advisory committee, only 8 are law enforcement officials and only 4 of them are police administrators.
'8 MODEL CODE, XXI-XXV.
19DEL. CODE A N. tit. 11, §1902 (1953); MASS. GEN
LAWS ch. 41, §98 (1958); N.H. REv. STAT ANN. §594:
(1953); N.Y. CODE CnMe. PRoC. §180-a; R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §12-7-1 (1956).
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material aid to the investigation thereof,
order such person to remain in or near such
place in the officer's presence for a period of
not more than twenty minutes.
(2) Stopping of Persons in Suspicious
Circumstances. A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, if a person
is observed in circumstances which suggest
that he has committed or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor, and such
action if reasonably necessary to enable the
officer to determine the lawfulness of that
person's conduct, order that person to
remain in or near such place in the officer's
presence for a period of not more than twenty
minutes.
Other subsections provide: The officer may use
non-deadly force to effect such a stop, and he
may search the person and his immediate surroundings for dangerous weapons if he reasonably
believes that his safety requires it; during the onethird hour allowed, the officer may obtain identification and verify that identification and also
whatever account such person may give concerning
2
his presence and conduct. 1
To permit this stopping power to be operative
in any place in which the officer is "lawfully present", rather than just in public places, is eminently sound. Also commendable is the inclusion
of the power to detain witnesses as well as suspects,
a facet not included in the present stop-and-frisk
statutes but not condemned by case law. l
The use of the twenty-minute time limit is
debatable, however. Because the time period obviously runs concurrently for all detained persons
when a number of witnesses or suspects are involved, a time period suitable for dealing with one
may well be unreasonably short when there are
many. The "Urgent Necessity" exception in
section 9.11, applicable only to the prevention of
serious danger or the protection of interests of
great magnitude, would not usually be of any help
in extending the time in this kind of situation.
A more general statement of the time period
should be considered, such as the "brief time"
phrase discarded by the Reporters,n remembering
that the spatial limitation of the detention, within
a radius "near" the place of stopping, contains a
2 MODEL CODE, §2.02.
2t
Busby v. United States, 296 F. 2d 328, 331 (9th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962); Hargus v.
State, 54 P. 2d 211, 214 (Okla. 1935).
2 MODEL CODE, Commentary to §2.02, p. 101.

built-in deterrent to delay, in that police units are
not likely to extend unduly a detection which
immobilizes them at a place chosen by happenstance.
Another reason for a more flexible time limit is
the heavy exclusion-of-evidence sanctions which
can result if the minute count is exceeded. Under
section 3.05(1) of the Code, if the officer fails to
release the person expressly within the time limit,
all the rights and protections accorded by the Code
to arrested persons then accrue; with an illegal
arrest situation thus arising, statements can become inadmissable under section 9.02, an exclusion
which can be escalated by section 9.09, a statutory
version of the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Although section 9.10 provides some leeway,
in permitting a court to accept evidence nevertheless when the violation of the Code is minor or
excusably erroneous, it does not cure the fundamental arbitrariness of the twenty minute margin.
Other sanctions upon the police officer's conduct
will be provided in the form of penalties, according
to the Reporters; however they omit any provision
for express sanctions to require the witness or
suspect to stop or remain,u suggesting only that
resisting-arrest statutes might be construed to
apply. Express sanctions to aid the police officer
should be provided in any official adoption of the
Code.
Questions involving searches for items other than
dangerous weapons, during such detentions, are
so broad and important as to deserve fuller treatment than can be afforded here.
Aside from those questions of scope of search,
however, these pre-arrest investigations provisions
of the Code present an encouraging groundwork,
particularly if the time limit problems can be
resolved.
IhmrsTIGATION AnERr

ARnnsT

In a brief review of the Model Code provisions
affecting investigatory functions other than
searches, the "preliminary screening" described
under section 4.04 for persons arrested without a
warrant is of special interest.
That section provides that where a person is
arrested without a warrant-and therefore not
23
MODEL CODE §3.01 (3) contains an indirect sanction to obey an officer's stop order under §2.02, in that
failure to comply with an obligation imposed by the
Code may be a concurrent factor in determining reasonable cause for arrest, but such non-compliance
alone does not justify arrest.
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pursuant to a formal charge-there may be a
"preliminary screening" to decide as to a formal
charge, extending not more than four hours from
the time of arrest. In the case of named serious
felonies, that period may be extended, depending
upon the time of day the arrest was made, up to
14, 16 or 22 hours maximum.
The Code uses the term "screening" to underscore the intent that any such period of detention
may be used only to arrive at a decision concerning
the charge,n and not for the purpose of building
a case to prove it, although the two purposes
necessarily overlap somewhat.
Whatever the time limit, the Code provisions
governing the conduct of such screening will insure
that the period is a busy one for the police. As
soon as the arrested person is brought to the station, the police must, in addition to recording the
time of arrival, inform the arrested person about
the period of detention, commitment and bail, the
absence of obligation to speak, the possible use in
evidence of his statements, his privilege to communicate by telephone, the availability of funds
for that purpose, the access to be afforded to counsel or relative or friend, and the availability of
counsel for indigents, if such is provided. Most of
this information is also required to be delivered in
25

printed form.

Promptly thereafter, telephoning opportunity
must be afforded. In addition, throughout the
screening period, there must be "reasonable opportunity" to use the telephone upon request.26
The access of counsel-or a relative or friend in
lieu of legal counsel-is also broadly afforded.
Counsel is to have access by telephone and in
person whenever the arrested person requests his
presence.2 Indeed, the arrested person must be
given "reasonable opportunity from time to time"
to consult in, private with counsel or relative or
friend;"8 presumably such privacy could be under
control sufficient to maintain safety of custody.
These provisions would seem to be more susceptible of abuse by the arrested person and his counsel, relative or friend than by the police. Recorded
questioning is permitted in the absence of counsel,
but only during the first four hours; 9 thereafter
any "sustained questioning" in the absence of
counsel is prohibited."0 When the identification
2MODEL
25 MODEL
26 MODEL

CODE §4.04 (1).
CODE §4.01.
CODE §§4.01 (5), 5.07 (2).

MODEL CODE §5.07.

"8Ibid.

§§4.04, 4.09, 5.01.
0MODEL CODE §5.08.

29MODEL CODE
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procedures and confrontations allowed by section
5.01 are also considered, it is clear that the police
will have little opportunity for questioning, with
or without counsel, particularly in the case of
the experienced criminal.
Again the sanctions are all against the police,
particularly through the subsequent exclusion of
statements and their fruits, which can occur pursuant to failure to issue the prescribed warnings
or failure to permit the prescribed telephoning,
access or consultation opportunities.'
Although it may not be possible to turn in any
direction away from Mapp v. Ohio 2 and its kin,
it is difficult to avoid the conviction that the
exclusion sanctions really operate to punish
society rather than the police, wherever they
operate to deprive society of evidential armament
against the criminal.
Another problem arises by the fact that, since
the screening is available only for the purpose of
arriving at a formal charge, no period of investigation-particularly questioning-appears to be
made available where the suspect has been arrested upon a warrant, which issues pursuant to
formal charge. In such cases, says the Commentary
to the Code, "no period of screening is justified,
and the accused should be brought before a magistrate as soon as purely administrative steps in
the police station have been completed."" Thus
the pre-existence of an arrest warrant prohibits
interrogation except, according to section 5.09, by
consent with the advice of counsel.
Other investigative procedures may also be
prohibited by the Code in the case of a person
arrested under warrant, if the comment about
"purely administrative steps" is to be read strictly.
Lineups and confrontations would seem to be
more than "purely administrative" and thus
barred. Although the taking of the fingerprints
and photographs of the arrested person would
seem to be "purely administrative steps", those
matters are listed along with lineups and confrontations as the "Permitted Investigation"
under section 5.01, the Note to which suggests
that it is confined to the screening of persons
arrested without warrant. Clarification of the text
or notes as to section 5.01 would be desirable.
The Code's prohibition against the questioning
of persons arrested under a warrant-set forth in
"1 MODEL CODE §§9.03, 9.05, 9.09.
3"367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3MODEL CODE, Commentary to Article 4, 147. See,
in this regard, Phillips v. State, 139 N.W. 2d 41 (Wis.
1966); Abstracts of Recent Cases, 57 J. Cums. L., C. &

P.S. 178, 183-185 (1966).

SUPREME COURT AND THE POLICE

section 5.09 as indicated above-except in the
unlikely eventuality that legal counsel has advised
consent thereto, needs reexamination. This approach rests upon the assumption that an arrest
warrant follows a complaint which, in turn, is
based upon such full official consideration that it
is unnecessary to conduct the "screening" allowed
with respect to persons arrested without a warrant.
However, such an assumption ignores the fact
that a complaint cannot always be based upon independent official investigation, but will many
times be based upon the assertions of a complainant who is confused, ill-informed, mistaken
or even malicious. Thus the subsequent official
screening may well be needed when the arrest is
under warrant just as much as when made without
a warrant.
Moreover, by virtue of section 3.06 of the Code,
the use of a warrant may hinge upon the fact that
the arrest is to be made upon private premises
or at night, factors which relate not at all to the
appropriateness of post-arrest investigation and
questioning.
The type of formal base on which the arrest is
founded should not make a difference as to the
substance of the official pre-commitment investigation. To support the Code's authorization of
"screening" of persons arrested without a warrant,
the Commentary to the Code cites the need for
"resolving the doubts and confusions which will
necessarily accompany many arrests without a
warrant. ' ' n The point is that many doubts and
confusions can and do often accompany arrests
made pursuant to a warrant. Although the complaint has been lodged, and the police cannot
release the arrested person upon their own findings-as they may do under section 4.04(3) where
there has been no arrest warrant-police investigation will necessarily produce a fuller case at the
time the arrested person is brought before a
magistrate, and a fuller case should be to the advantage of the innocent as well as to the disadvantage of the guilty.
The Code distinction between warrant arrests
and non-warrant arrests seems to reveal a basic
distrust of police objectivity.
Of course, to permit the police to conduct the
same investigation, in terms of time and content,
of persons arrested upon warrants as is allowed
with respect to those arrested without warrants,
would necessarily mean an abandonment of the
concept that the "screening" is theoretically only
" MoDEL CODE, 141.

for the purpose of determining the nature of the
charge and not to build the quantum of evidence.
Yet the "screening" necessarily possesses a purely
evidential and case-building or case-eliminating
element, as indicated by the Code's view that it
can also lead to the release of the innocent. Moreover, the "screening" power will inevitably be
used by any conscientious police unit as an evidence-gathering process; therefore, the Code
contains an unintended discrimination in favor of
the person whose arrest happens to occur pursuant
to a warrant.
The Code draft deserves careful reconsideration
toward the end that post-arrest investigation with
respect to all arrested persons be frankly allowed.
CONCLUSION

Despite the very thorough and dedicated work
of the Model Code developers, it does appear that
the Code draft, like many of the court decisions,
over-restricts the police through a distrustful
refusal to accept the fact that the great preponderance of police officers are, as servants of the
public, dedicated to sounder goals than the racking
up of convictions against hapless suspects who
stray their way. Anyone familiar with the daily
work of a professional police organization knows
that the investigative officers display considerable
objectivity in that they are quick to absolve persons who are victims of unfounded accusation
and are slow to jump to conclusions of guilt.
The injustice which society suffers at the hands
of unpunished criminals can be, and is, accurately
measured in the statistics of crimes not cleared.
Any further restriction of police investigative
powers can be justified only by a similarly accurate measurement of harm done to the innocent
by methods presently accepted. Although such an
assessment is admittedly difficult, it is submitted
that the burden of proof is upon those who assume
that police are to be distrusted. The court decisions
which involve abuse of police authority certainly
do not constitute a sufficient sampling of the
whole picture. Until adequate social science measurement is performed, the admirable and necessary
effort to codify the legal restrictions on police
work should attempt to formulate restrictions to
a basic degree rather than to an ultimate extent.
To be quite blunt, if certainty and simplicity
can be achieved only at the cost of rigid and narrow restrictions, that cost may be too great for
society to bear.

